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I. Introduction
This paper aims to examine the potential role of conflict of laws, or private 
international law,（１） in coordinating the relation among different treaties in public 
international law. In particular, it focuses on the conflict of rules and principles（２） 
between WTO law and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions (hereinafter the Cultural Diversity Convention, or 
the CDC（３）).
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO system, 
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（１） 　In this article, the notion of conflict of laws is used as meaning the body of law that deals with 
conflict of domestic laws in case of a dispute over legal relationships which are connected to 
more than one legal order.
（２） 　In this article, the notion “conflict of rules and principles” is used as meaning “a situation 
where two rules or principles suggest different ways of dealing with a problem.” See Report of 
the Work of the Study Group of the International Law Commission on Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, 18 July 2006 [hereinafter referred to as 
“Fragmentation Report”], para. 25, available at <http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_
cn4_l682.pdf>.
（３） 　See <https://en.unesco.org/creativity/convention>.
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nation-states have pursued a free-trade policy for goods and services beyond borders. 
Cultural goods and services, such as movies, television programs, and so forth, are 
not the exception.（４） With such cultural exchange beyond borders, people have been 
able to access and enjoy foreign cultural goods and services. Free trade of cultural 
goods and services has thus contributed to a deeper understanding between people 
beyond borders. In other words, historically and even nowadays, trade beyond 
borders has been a precondition for cultural diversity.（５）
However, there has also been tension between trade and culture. For example, 
it is known that some states, facing the overwhelming dominance of the American 
film industry since the 1920s, introduced a so-called screen quota system requiring 
certain screening days and/or theaters for their domestic films.（６） While this system 
was adopted to protect and cultivate domestic film industries, the United States 
criticized it from a commercial and free-trade viewpoint.（７） Historically, such protective 
cultural policies̶such as local content requests, import bans of foreign cultural 
goods and services, tax privileges, or subsidies for local cultural goods and services̶
have caused some international trade disputes in the audiovisual industry and the 
publication industry.（８） This “trade and culture” conflict has become one of the topics 
（４） 　As a recent example, the Government of Japan has adopted a new initiative, called “Cool 
Japan Initiative,” to promote an oversea expansion of Japanese cultural contents, such as 
animations, manga, characters, games and so-forth. See Japanese Cabinet Office, Cool Japan 
Strategy, <https://www.cao.go.jp/cool_japan/english/index-e.html>.
（５） 　Michael Hahn, A Clash of Cultures? The UNESCO Diversity Convention and International 
Trade Law, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2006), p. 515, p. 520.
（６） 　See id. p. 522. See also, Sungeun Shim, Eizō Media no Kokusaika: Niti/Bei/Ei no Seisaku 
Hikaku wo Chūshin nishite [The internationalization of audiovisual media: a comparison of the 
policies in Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom], NHK Hōsō Bunka Kenkyū 
Nenpō [Yearbook of NHK Broadcasting Culture Research], No. 51, p. 105 (2007), p. 113.
（７） 　See Shim, ibid.
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during the GATT’s multilateral trade negotiation, the Uruguay Round.
With this background, the General Conference of the UNESCO adopted the 
Cultural Diversity Convention in 2005.（９） The creation of the CDC, however, has 
generated a risk of conflict between its rules and principles and those of WTO law. 
This conflict of rules and principles in different treaty systems, sometimes called a 
“conflict of regimes,” is a general problem in modern public international law, which 
is due to the functionalization or differentiation of the international law system, 
generally referred to as the phenomenon of “fragmentation of international law.”（10）
The Study Group of the International Law Commission on Fragmentation of 
International Law published a seminal report, generally called the Fragmentation 
Report,（11） which mainly concluded that there is a limitation of traditional principles 
in public international law, such as the principles of lex specials or lex posterior, to 
coordinate a conflict of regimes in public international law.（12） The report thus 
suggests that much attention should be paid to searching for new methods to solve 
conflicts of norms among different international treaties.（13） 
In this context, while there have been several discussions in public 
international law doctrine on the topic, it is noteworthy that recent literature has paid 
attention to the conflict of laws doctrine to find a solution to the conflict of treaties in 
public international law.（14） Furthermore, a recent academic work adopts some 
approaches in the conflict of laws doctrine to search for a more promising solution to 
（８） 　Takao Suami, Bōeki to Bunka [Trade and Culture], in Akira Kotera (ed.), Tenkanki no WTO: 
Hi-Bōeki teki Kanshin Jikō no Bunseki [WTO at the crossroads: An Analysis of Non-Trade Issue 
Linkages], (Tōyo Keizai Shinpōsha, 2003) p. 229, pp. 233-238.
（９） 　See, in II.
（10） 　See generally, Fragmentation Report, supra note 2.
（11） 　Ibid.
（12） 　Id. para. 488.
（13） 　Id. para. 493.
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the conflict of rules and principles between WTO law and the CDC. Hence, it seems 
appropriate to further contribute to these recent discussions on the side of the conflict 
of laws doctrine. To this end, the WTO‒CDC conflict could provide a good but less 
examined example. Against this background, this paper addresses the matter from a 
conflict of laws perspective.
In the following sections, the paper first provides an overview of the CDC as 
well as its relationship with the WTO (II.). It then briefly describes a few doctrines 
that focus on conflict-of-laws principles and methods for solving conflict of treaties 
in public international law (III.). Lastly, it argues that a conflict of laws perspective 
may be useful and shows how it could help in dealing with norm conflicts in 
international law (IV.).
II. The Cultural Diversity Convention
In this section, we first illustrate how the “trade and culture debate” within the WTO 
has developed into the creation of a new convention outside it, that is, in UNESCO 
(A.). Then, we provide an overview of the basic structure of the CDC and illustrate its 
potential conflicts with WTO law (B.).
A. Background: From the WTO to UNESCO（15）
Trade and culture conflicts intensified especially around the end of the 
（14） 　See, e.g., Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime Collisions: The Vain Search 
for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation in International Law, Michigan Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 25, Issue 4 (2004), p. 999. Yet, for an earlier work, see C. Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict 
of Law-Making Treaties, British Year Book of International Law (1953), p. 401. See also, in III.
（15） 　For a detailed explanation and analysis of these history written in Japanese, see Toshiyuki 
Kono, Bunka Tayōsei to Kokusai-Hō (1)(2) [Cultural Diversity and International Law (1)(2)], 
Minshō-Hō Zasshi [Journal of Civil and Commercial Law], vol. 135, No. 1, p. 58 and No. 2, 287 
(2006).
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1990s.（16） In fact, some mostly European states, such as France and Canada, strongly 
but unsuccessfully demanded the insertion of a cultural-exception clause in WTO law 
during the Uruguay Round.（17） After this failure, the cultural-exception proponents 
attempted to shift the forum for negotiation and rulemaking to another culture-
oriented international institution̶UNESCO.（18）
There are two important movements behind this shift, both on the part of 
UNESCO and on the part of the states advocating a cultural exception. On the one 
hand, around the beginning of the 1990s, an initiative led by UNESCO as well as the 
United Nations sought to pursue further acknowledgment of the cultural dimension of 
development.（19） In 1995, the World Commission on Culture and Development, 
created by UNESCO and the United Nations, published the seminal report Our 
Creative Diversity,（20） which firmly recognized the importance of culture in the 
development process. It is worth noting that the report, after describing culture as “the 
foundation of our progress and creativity,”（21） states that “[t]he diversity and plurality 
of cultures has benefits comparable to those of bio-diversity.”（22） The need for efforts 
to preserve cultural diversity was also acknowledged at the UNESCO-sponsored 
Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development, held in 
Stockholm in 1998.（23）
（16） 　Kono (1), id. p. 72.
（17） 　Kono (1), id. p. 73.
（18） 　See Kono (2), supra note 15, p. 306ff.
（19） 　See Mira Burri, Cultural Diversity as a Concept of Global Law: Origins, Evolution and 
Prospects, Diversity, Vol.2 (2010), pp.1059-1084, p. 1063, available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1585139>.
（20） 　World Commission on Culture and Development, Our Creative Diversity: Report of the 
World Commission on Culture and Development (1995), available at <https://unesdoc.unesco.
org/ark:/48223/pf0000101651>.
（21） 　Id. p. 15.
（22） 　Id. p. 54.
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On the other hand, the states that advocated the protection of cultures against 
economic globalization had been searching for another forum to create an 
international instrument on cultural policies. For example, after the 1998 Stockholm 
Conference and other follow-up conferences, the International Network on Cultural 
Policy (INCP) was created as an informal forum where national cultural ministers can 
discuss cultural policy issues.（24） The INCP’s agenda had been set by a small group of 
states composed of the cultural-exception proponents during the Uruguay Round.（25） 
In 2003, after several internal meetings and discussions, the working group on 
cultural diversity and globalization in the INCP contacted the director general of 
UNESCO to persuade the organization to draft an international convention on cultural 
diversity on its agenda.（26）
This way, combined with UNESCO’s notion of cultural pluralism, the trade 
and culture debate was intentionally reconceptualized as a more positive discourse of 
the protection and promotion of cultural diversity.（27） In the end, shortly after the 
adoption of the 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity,（28） the 
UNESCO General Conference made a resolution of drawing up an international 
convention on cultural diversity in 2003.（29） After only two years of drafting, the CDC 
was adopted by 148 states on October 20, 2005, at the 33rd session of the UNESCO 
（23） 　Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development, Stockholm, 1998, final 
report, CLT.98/CONF.210/5, CLT.98/CONF.210/CLD.19, available at <https://unesdoc.unesco.
org/ark:/48223/pf0000113935>. See also, Burri, supra note 19, p. 1063.
（24） 　See Kono (2), supra note 15, p. 306; Burri, supra note 19, p. 1063.
（25） 　They were Canada, Croatia, France, Greece, Mexico, Senegal, South Africa, Sweden and 
Switzerland. See Kono (2), id. p. 307; Burri, id. pp. 1063-1064.
（26） 　See Kono (2), id. p. 308.
（27） 　See Burri, supra note 19, p. 1063.
（28） 　See <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13179&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_
SECTION=201.html>.
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General Conference, and entered into force on March 18, 2007.（30） As of September 
2019, the parties to the convention include 145 states and the EU.（31）
B. Overview of the CDC
1. Basic Rules
First, the objective of the CDC is “to protect and promote the diversity of cultural 
expressions.”（32） The convention “shall apply to the policies and measures adopted by 
the Parties related to the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural 
expressions.”（33）
The main article on the CDC’s substantive rules is Art. 6, prescribing that 
parties to the CDC, reaffirming “their sovereign rights”（34） to do so, “may adopt 
measures aimed at protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions 
within its territory.”（35） Art. 6, para. 2, of the CDC enumerates, but is not limited to, 
（29） 　Resolution 32 C/34 of the General Conference, 32nd session, Paris, on 17 October 2003, 
Desirability of Drawing up an International Standard-setting Instrument on Cultural Diversity, 
available at <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000133171.page=70>.
（30） 　Burri, supra note 19, p. 1064.
（31） 　For a list of the parties, see <https://en.unesco.org/creativity/convention>. Japan as well as the 
US are not the parties to the convention.
（32） 　Art. 1(a) of the CDC. “Cultural expressions” are defined as “those expressions that result from 
the creativity of individuals, groups and societies, and that have cultural content” (Art. 4(3) of 
the CDC).
（33） 　Art. 3 of the CDC. “Cultural policies and measures” are defined as follows: “those policies 
and measures relating to culture, whether at the local, national, regional or international level 
that are either focused on culture as such or are designed to have a direct effect on cultural 
expressions of individuals, groups or societies, including on the creation, production, 
dissemination, distribution of and access to cultural activities, goods and services” (Art. 4(6) of 
the CDC).
（34） 　Art. 5(1) of the CDC.
（35） 　Art. 6(1) of the CDC.
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the measures that the CDC’s contracting parties may adopt. For example, these 
measures include “(b) measures that, in an appropriate manner, provide opportunities 
for domestic cultural activities, goods and services among all those available within 
the national territory for the creation, production, dissemination, distribution, and 
enjoyment of such domestic cultural activities, goods and services, including 
provisions relating to the language used for such activities, goods and services” ; “(d) 
measures aimed at providing public financial assistance” ; and others.
Meanwhile, CDC’s Art. 8 provides that, where “cultural expressions on its 
territory are at risk of extinction, under serious threat, or otherwise in need of urgent 
safeguarding,”（36） each party “may take all appropriate measures to protect and 
preserve cultural expressions.”（37）
In relation to WTO law, certain cultural measures in accordance with Arts. 6 
and 8 risk violating, for example, the national treatment obligation under WTO law.（38） 
Pulkowski（39） states that, where a CDC party takes preferential treatment for domestic 
cultural goods and services as opposed to foreign ones̶such as subsidies, tax 
exemptions, market access restrictions, and local content requests̶such treatment 
might be incompatible with the national treatment obligation in WTO law.（40） In 
addition to Art. 6, Pulkowski indicates that certain urgent local market restrictions in 
accordance with Art. 8 might also be contrary to the national treatment obligation.（41）
2. A Conflict Clause: Article 20
It should be noted that the CDC drafters were well aware of its close relations with 
（36） 　Art. 8(1) of the CDC.
（37） 　Art. 8(2) of the CDC.
（38） 　See also, in III.A.1.
（39） 　For an overview on his argument, see, in III.A.
（40） 　Pulkowski, infra note 54, p. 162ff.
（41） 　Ibid.
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other international instruments.（42） Therefore, the CDC is equipped with a provision 
that manages possible conflicts between its norms and those of other treaties at the 
levels of interpretation, the application of norms, and treaty-making. This so-called 
conflict clause（43） provides,
 Art . 20 - Relat ionship to other t reat ies : mutual support iveness , 
complementarity and non-subordination
      1.  Parties recognize that they shall perform in good faith their obligations 
under this Convention and all other treaties to which they are parties. 
Accordingly, without subordinating this Convention to any other treaty,
                a.  they shall foster mutual supportiveness between this convention 
and the other treaties to which they are parties; and
                b.  when interpreting and applying the other treaties to which they are 
parties or when entering into other international obligations, 
Parties shall take into account the relevant provisions of this 
Convention.
      2.  Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying rights and 
obligations of the Parties under any other treaties to which they are 
parties.
 Art. 20 employs two relatively new concepts related to its relation with other 
treaties: nonsubordination (Art. 20, para. 1, second sentence) and mutual 
（42） 　For its drafting history, see Peter-Tobias Stoll, Article 20, in Sabine von Schorlemer & Peter-
Tobias Stoll (eds.), The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity 
of Cultural Expressions: Explanatory Notes (Springer, 2012), pp. 525-529.
（43） 　For a typology of conflict of clauses, see generally, Fragmentation Report, supra note 2, p. 
135ff.
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supportiveness (Art. 20, para. 1, lit. a).（44） These have appeared in the preambles of 
some environmental agreements.（45） Peter-Tobias Stoll concludes that, through the 
concept of nonsubordination, the CDC makes “a plea not to give any automatic 
preference to the norms of another international treaty vis-à-vis the norms of the 
CDC.”（46） Rather, by referring to the concept of mutual supportiveness, the CDC 
pursues “a state of affairs where the operation of the two different agreements is 
geared in a way that secures maximum attainment of the aims of both agreements.”（47）
As a “counterbalance to para 1,”（48） however, the second paragraph of Art. 20 
explicitly expresses the idea of not modifying the parties’ rights and obligations under 
other treaties. Stoll argues that, since such limits depend on “the textual limits of 
interpretation of rights and obligations of the other agreements,” “para. 2 allows the 
CDC and its interpretation to impact rights and obligations of other treaties within the 
proper limits of the latter’s interpretation.”（49）
As we will discuss later,（50） the problem of Art. 20 lies in its ambiguity and 
indecisiveness as a conflict clause̶it is not clear how the provision can be applied to 
concrete situations. Some commentators have criticized it for its ambivalent nature of 
mutual supportiveness (Art. 20(1)) and no modification (Art. 20(2)).（51） In fact, as 
Joost Pauwelyn puts it, the provision “goes both ways.”（52）
（44） 　Stoll, supra note 42, p.531.
（45） 　Examples cover the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for 
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (adopted, 10 September 
1998); the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted, 
29 January 2000); the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA) (adopted, 3 November 2001). See also, infra note 141.
（46） 　Stoll, supra note 42, p. 532.
（47） 　Ibid.
（48） 　See id. p. 540.
（49） 　Id. p. 542.
（50） 　See, in III.2., IV.B.1.
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III. WTO-CDC Conflict Management
Indeed, there have been several arguments on the conflict management between WTO 
law and the CDC.（53） Recently, however, one scholar argued for a new perspective that 
the conflict of laws doctrine can help international law manage the WTO-CDC 
conflict. This section summarizes this argument.
A. Pulkowski’s Analysis of the WTO-CDC Conflict
In his book The Law and Politics of International Regime Conflict, Dirk Pulkowski 
thoroughly investigates regime conflicts in public international law,（54） focusing on the 
conflict among WTO law, the CDC, and human rights law. After analyzing the nature 
or characteristics of regime conflicts（55） as well as reviewing the doctrinal debate on 
whether international law is unitary or plural,（56） Pulkowski argues that, while “‘strong’ 
conceptions of legal unity of the international legal order have failed,”（57） a certain 
degree of coordination between different regimes is made possible because of “the 
（51） 　See, e.g., Valentina Vadi, Cultural Heritage in International Investment Law and Arbitration 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 172 (citing, Serge Regourd, Le projet de Convention 
UNESCO sur la diversité culturelle: vers une victoire à la Pyrrhus, Légipress, No. 226 (2005), p. 
116).
（52） 　Joost Pauwelyn, The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, and the WTO: Diversity in 
International Law-Making?, ASIL Insights, Vol. 9, Issue 35 (2005), available at <https://www.
asil.org/insights/volume/9/issue/35/unesco-convention-cultural-diversity-and-wto-diversity-
international-law>.
（53） 　See, e.g., Tania Voon, Cultural Products and the World Trade Organization (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).
（54） 　Dirk Pulkowski, The Law and Politics of International Regime Conflict (Oxford University 
Press, 2014), p. 20.
（55） 　See Pulkowski, id. Chapters 2-4.
（56） 　See, id. Chapter 5.
（57） 　Id. p. 237.
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shared discourse rules of international law.”（58）
More specifically, Pulkowski claims that international law has two techniques 
to manage regime conflicts: interpretation (1.) and legal priority rules (2.). The 
conflict of laws doctrine is relied upon where conflict is unavoidable by either 
interpretation or priority rule (3.).
1. Harmonizing Interpretation（59）
Pulkowski argues that certain rule conflicts between different regimes can be 
prevented through techniques of interpretation.（60） First, he examines some rules in 
both regimes that are amenable to harmonizing interpretation. Second, he seeks to 
identify the extent to which such interpretation is possible from a value perspective.
a) Rules Amenable to Harmonizing Interpretation
In relation to the WTO regime, Pulkowski suggests a possible expansive 
（58） 　Id. p. 20, 238-239. According to Pulkowski, such rules are shared among various international 
regimes, and thus function as “a grammar for communicative regimes, which is shared by all 
treaty-based international regimes” (p. 238). In particular, rather than presenting the grammar in 
a systematic way, he focuses on three relevant elements of that grammar: 1) doctrinal borrowing 
of legal concepts; 2) recourse to general international law; 3) common rules of treaty 
interpretation (pp. 244-250).
（59） 　According to Pulkowski, the idea of harmonizing interpretation in international law, means 
“the notion that one legal rule must be interpreted ‘in the light of’ another rule.” Id. pp. 273.
（60） 　Id. p. 20, 237. He raises four key techniques of interpretation provided by international law: i) 
interpretation of terms “in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the terms” (Article 
31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [VCLT]); ii) taking into account of “any 
relevant rules of international law” (Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT); iii) general principles of 
harmonizing interpretation, such as the rules developed by international courts and tribunals; iv) 
principle of default deference, which means “international adjudicators should approach case 
law from other regimes with an attitude of ‘default deference” (p. 296). Id. p. 273, pp. 284-297.
広島法学　43 巻３号（2020 年）－ 338
− 43 −
interpretation of Art. XX(f) of the GATT.（61） While the provision was originally 
drafted to cover tangible cultural property, he argues that an evolutionary 
interpretation（62） could include other intangible cultural creations.（63） Another 
suggestion is a culture-conscious interpretation of the concept of “like product” (Art. 
III:2 and Art. III:4), which is related to the national treatment obligation.（64） Here, 
Pulkowski claims that the sameness of physical properties is not decisive for the 
determination of likeness between domestic and foreign cultural goods.（65） Rather, he 
states that certain legal measures favorable to films, books, and magazines on local 
history or cultural life may not constitute a breach of the national treatment obligation 
because such cultural goods present unique characteristics due to their local nature.（66）
In relation to the CDC, Pulkowski argues that the convention in fact limits 
itself with respect to its scope of application. For example, as Art. 4(6) of the CDC（67） 
defines “cultural policies and measures” as those “designed to have a direct effect on 
cultural expressions,” he suspects that “measures that have an accidental or indirect 
impact” on cultural expressions would not be covered by the CDC.（68） Pulkowski thus 
（61） 　Art. XX of the GATT provides that “nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:……(f) imposed for the 
protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value.”
（62） 　With this respect, he refers to the interpretation of “natural resources” under Art. XX(g) by the 
Appellate Body, which construed the word as covering not only oil, gas, coal or minerals, but 
also living organisms such as fish and sea turtles (See United States---Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 
November 1998: VII, 2755, para. 130). Id. p. 299.
（63） 　Ibid.
（64） 　Id. pp. 300-301.
（65） 　Id. p. 301.
（66） 　Ibid. Pulkowski also examines possible interpretations under the GATS and the SMG 
Agreement. See id. pp. 301-303.
（67） 　See supra note 33.
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emphasizes that the CDC, with such a “built-in limitation,” intends to “cover only 
measures whose primary purpose is to produce direct effects on opportunities for 
cultural expression.”（69）
b) Searching for a Shared Goal among the Regimes
After his rule-by-rule analysis, Pulkowski attempts to find the condition of such 
coordination between WTO law and the CDC at the interpretation level. He states that 
harmonizing interpretation is likely to succeed in practice only if an interpretation is 
consistent with the common goals of both regimes.（70） With this regard, he proposes 
the concept of “individual cultural liberty”（71） as the CDC’s key goal, which is 
consistent with the WTO’s liberal trade regime.（72） Pulkowski argues that the concept 
of cultural individual liberty is compatible with international trade law for two 
reasons. First, the free choice of cultural expression that people like is consistent with 
trade law’s emphasis on consumer preferences.（73） Second, promoting individual 
cultural liberty is less likely to rely on group-based or country-based distinctions, 
which are problematic under WTO law.（74）
2. Priority Rules
Pulkowski claims that, while it is possible to prevent certain rule conflicts at the level 
（68） 　Pulkowski, supra note 54, p. 304.
（69） 　Ibid.
（70） 　Id. p. 305.
（71） 　More specifically, it seems that Pulkowski refers to the concept as meaning not impeding “the 
individual freedom of individuals to choose their cultural affiliations and express their cultural 
identities” (p. 311).
（72） 　Id. pp. 305-316.
（73） 　Id. p. 315.
（74） 　Id. p. 316.
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of interpretation, occasionally, no rational interpretation may be conceivable to 
reconcile the rules of different regimes.（75） Yet even in such a situation, some priority 
rules provided by international law could help the interpreter and decision-maker to 
manage conflict among treaties. Here, Pulkowski argues that the nonsubordination 
clause of the CDC, Art. 20, can solve rule conflicts to a considerable extent.（76）
Indeed, Pulkowski admits that Art. 20 appears to be “an ‘agreement to 
disagree’, rather than an operational priority rule.”（77） However, he proposes another 
interpretation, which, according to him, can confer “the meaning of, and preserves a 
meaningful scope of application for, all paragraphs of Article 20”（78）: while Art. 20(2) 
subordinates the CDC to preexisting treaty obligations, Art. 20(1), concerned with 
future treaty obligations, stipulates that the CDC shall not be subordinated to future 
international treaties.（79）
In other words, the CDC is inferior to any treaty to which a state is already a 
party when the CDC was ratified pursuant to Art. 20(2).（80） By contrast, “states that 
accede to the WTO . . . after they become parties to the CDC could find themselves in 
a conflict situation which is not resolved by the priority rule of Article 20(2) of the 
CDC.”（81） These states（82） need to search for another solution to manage the rule 
conflicts that are not reconciled by either interpretation or the priority rule (Art. 20 of 
（75） 　Id. p. 317.
（76） 　Id. pp. 319-322.
（77） 　Id. p. 336.
（78） 　Id. p. 337. To reach that interpretation, he refers to a proposed amendment to (now) Art. 20 of 
the CDC submitted by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU). See European Broadcasting 
Union, EBU position Paper on Draft UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, 18 May 2005, 
DAJ/MW/jev/jmc, available at <https://www.ebu.ch/publications/position-papers/2005/unesco-
convention-on-cultural-di>.
（79） 　Id. pp. 337-338.
（80） 　Id. p. 341.
（81） 　Ibid.
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the CDC).
3. Recourse to Conflict of Laws Doctrine
In cases where priority rules do not clearly address rule conflict, Pulkowski argues 
that the transposition of the principles in conflict of laws is more promising than 
relying on the general and traditional priority rules̶the lex specialis and lex 
posterior maxims. As WTO law and the CDC cannot be considered as pertaining to 
the same subject matter, these maxims will not be available for managing rule 
conflicts among different regimes.（83） Referring to the analyses by Pauwelyn and 
Michaels,（84） Pulkowski states that “regime conflicts have much in common with 
traditional jurisdictional conflicts between national legal orders.”（85） In short, by 
borrowing Michaels and Pauwelyn’s concept of “intra-systemic/inter-systemic 
conflicts,”（86） he characterizes regime conflicts as similar with “‘inter-systemic 
conflicts’ more than ‘intra-systemic conflicts.’”（87）
Here, Pulkowski turns to the conflict of laws doctrine and examines several 
（82） 　As of the end of September 2019, there seems to be five states that ratified the CDC before 
acceding to the WTO (Afghanistan, Lao People’ s Democratic Republic, Montenegro, 
Seychelles and Tajikistan) and some contracting parties to the CDC are currently in the process 
of accession to the WTO. For a list of the parties to the CDC, see <https://en.unesco.org/
creativity/convention/parties>, and for the WTO, see <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm>.
（83） 　Pulkowski, supra note 54, p. 329.
（84） 　See Ralf Michaels & Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different 
Techniques in the Fragmentation of Public International Law, Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2012), p. 349, available at <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/
djcil/vol22/iss3/3>. For an earlier extensive analysis on this issue by one of the authors, see 
Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other 
Rules of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
（85） 　Pulkowski, supra note 54, p. 329.
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choice-of-law approaches,（88） most of which have been proposed by academic writers 
in the United States in the course of the so-called American choice-of-law 
revolution.（89） In particular, he cites Brainerd Currie’s “governmental interest 
approach,”（90） which can be deemed the most influential approach in this context.（91） 
In essence, on the basic premise that “states have an interest in the outcome of 
multiple state disputes between private persons”（92） and in the rejection of the 
traditional continental style of preestablished choice-of-law rules (antirulism), 
Currie’s approach requires the judge to weigh conflicting state interests in each case 
to choose the applicable law to the dispute at hand.（93）
Pulkowski, however, acknowledges the criticisms to Currie’s approach, 
especially its preference for parochialism or forum law (lex fori),（94） which leads to 
frequent applications of forum law in practice. He thus relies on another but slightly 
modified version of the interest analysis approach, called the “comparative 
impairment” test formulated by William Baxter.（95） Rejecting Currie’s lex forism, 
（86） 　According to Michales and Pauwelyn, the former refers to the conflict of different norms 
within a system of international law, while the latter means the conflict between different 
systems of international law. See Michaels and Pauwelyn, supra note 84, pp. 350-351.
（87） 　Pulkowski, supra note 54,
（88） 　Id. pp. 331-334.
（89） 　In general, this refers to a movement in the US in which academic authors criticized the 
rigidity and value-neutrality of the traditional choice-of-law system which is originated in the 
nineteenth century, and proposed more flexible choice-of-law approaches that pay much 
attention to the policies or state interests behind private laws. For an overview of the theories 
proposed in the choice-of-law revolution, see generally, Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of 
Laws (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 93ff.
（90） 　Pulkowski, supra note 54, p. 332.
（91） 　For his influence, see Symeonides, supra note 89, pp. 103-104.
（92） 　Id. p. 105.
（93） 　In more detail, see id. pp. 97-103.
（94） 　Pulkowski, supra note 54, pp. 332-333.
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Baxter suggests that the judge should not weigh the interests but rather compare “the 
loss that would result from subordinating the interests of one state [with] those of 
another state.”（96） In short, under Baxter’s comparative impairment test, “the judge 
would apply the law of the state whose interests would be most impaired if its law 
were not applied.”（97）
Pulkowski thus finds Baxter’s approach as an appropriate tool for managing 
regime conflicts.（98） For Pulkowski, the approach can help identify “the particular 
regime whose authority would suffer most severely,” thus serving the purpose of 
regime conflict management: “to avoid as much as possible sacrifices of legal 
authority among the regimes involved.”（99） He argues that, while it may be sometimes 
difficult to detect which regime’s interests are most impaired, the comparative 
impairment test remains more promising than other alternatives. For example, as he 
mentions, “the resolution of the conflict could be left to the unfettered policy 
judgment of the interpreter,” but it “would likely result in resolution in favour of the 
lex fori in all but the most exceptional case.”（100）
In his final analysis, Pulkowski examines how a legal interpreter would rely on 
the comparative impairment test to choose one of the two regimes̶the WTO or the 
CDC.（101） He raises two hypothetical cultural measures and examines which regime 
would prevail in each situation:
（95） 　William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 
1 (1963), p. 1.
（96） 　Symeonides, supra note 89, pp. 106.
（97） 　Ibid.
（98） 　Pulkowski, supra note 54, p. 334.
（99） 　Ibid.
（100） 　Id. pp. 334-335.
（101） 　Id. p. 341.
広島法学　43 巻３号（2020 年）－ 332
− 49 −
̶  Case 1: “[A] start-up tax-break for young producers in a developing 
country which is reserved to nationals and contingent upon telling ‘local 
stories.’”（102） He claims that, while such subsidy is “potentially prohibited 
under Article III:2 and 4 of the GATT,” preference would be given to the 
CDC. On the one hand, such limited subsidy would not likely damage 
“trade flows and market access opportunities for foreign-produced in any 
significant way.”（103） On the other hand, such measure could be greatly 
helpful in achieving the CDC’s goal to foster “wide and balanced cultural 
exchanges” (Art. 1(c)) by strengthening the cultural industries in 
developing countries (Art. 14(a)(a)).
̶  Case 2: “[A] large-scale tax shelter for publishing companies which 
commit to print all books and magazines ‘at home.’”（104） Pulkowski argues 
that such tax privilege based on the mere location of the country of 
publication does not “create any positive impetus for the diversity of 
cultural expressions available in that country.”（105） Rather, such measure 
would be “a blatant contravention of the national treatment obligation”（106） 
under Arts. III:2 and 4 of the GATT. As the WTO’s objectives would be 
severely impaired if its rules were not applied, the WTO should prevail 
over the CDC in this situation.
B. Summary
As we have observed, Pulkowski argues that, after contending that rule conflicts can 
（102） 　Ibid. (emphasis added)
（103） 　Ibid.
（104） 　Ibid. (emphasis added)
（105） 　Id. p. 342.
（106） 　Id. pp. 341-342.
331 － The UNESCO Cultural Diversity Convention and the WTO（Shiho Kato）
− 50 −
be avoided to some extent at the level of interpretation, Art. 20 of the CDC could 
work well as a priority rule depending on the time factor. Only where the priority rule 
cannot work̶that is, in relation to a state that became party to the CDC before WTO 
accession̶Pulkowski refers to the conflict of laws doctrine. More specifically, he 
relies on the balancing interest approach, that is, Baxter’s comparative impairment 
test in the context of the American choice-of-law revolution. Yet several questions 
remain:
 i) General questions: Would conflict of norms in different regimes truly 
resemble conflict of domestic private laws? Why did Pulkowski refer only to 
American theories and ignored the traditional, rule-based, and value-neutral 
European or continental conflict of laws system?（107） As to the method, would 
the comparative impairment test be appropriate? Is there any other notion or 
technique we can borrow from the conflict of laws doctrine?（108）
 ii) Questions specific to the WTO‒CDC conflict: Could Art. 20 of the CDC be 
interpreted in the way that Pulkowski proposed?（109）
With these questions in mind, we will analyze the WTO‒CDC conflict from a conflict 
of laws perspective in the last section of the paper.
IV. An Analysis from the Conflict-of-law Perspective
This section examines how the conflict of laws doctrine could contribute to the 
management of the regime conflict between the WTO and the CDC. There are two 
steps in this examination: the first is to analyze the nature of the WTO‒CDC conflict 
（107） 　See, in IV.A.
（108） 　See, in IV.A.
（109） 　See, in IV.B.1.
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from a conflict of law perspective (A.), and the second is to consider issues specific to 
the WTO‒CDC conflict (B.).
A. The Nature of the WTO‒CDC Conflict
1. The WTO‒CDC Conflict as an Inter-systemic Conflict
As we have mentioned, Pulkowski identifies the nature of the WTO‒CDC conflict as 
inter-systemic. In the research cited by Pulkowski, Michaels and Pauwelyn argue that 
conflicts between branches of international law would be seen as inter-systemic.（110） 
They raise two reasons: First, in conflicts between sub-branches of international law, 
there is no uniform legislative intent on which a resolution could be based.（111） Second, 
there is no neutral or mutually accepted standard that could balance different values 
between different systems of international law.（112）
This analysis holds true with respect to the relation between the WTO and the 
CDC. Indeed, as illustrated in the history of the CDC,（113） the convention was created 
as a tactical and political project against̶yet with a view to influence̶the liberal 
trade regime such as the WTO system. This inherent political tension between the 
WTO and the CDC indicates that their conflict cannot avoid being classified as inter-
systemic.（114）
2. Inter-systemic Conflict as Analogous to Regulatory Law Conflict
As we have observed,（115） Pulkowski claims that inter-systemic conflict resembles 
（110） 　Michales and Pauwelyn, supra note 84, p. 367.
（111） 　Ibid.
（112） 　Id. pp. 367-368.
（113） 　See, in II.A.
（114） 　For an analysis on regime interaction as political contestation, see Martti Koskenniemi, 
Hegemonic Regimes, in Margaret A. Yong (ed.), Regime Interaction in International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 305.
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domestic law conflict. Here, the nature of domestic laws must be further clarified.
In the traditional continental system of conflict of laws, private law is regarded 
as being apolitical in nature,（116） and its spatial scope of application is determined by 
another body of law, that is, conflict of laws (its choice-of-law rules). By contrast, 
public law or regulatory law (e.g., competition law) has its own purpose and policy to 
realize in a public sphere, and thus, its spatial scope of application is considered to be 
decided by itself. In this respect, norms in international treaty seem to be closer to 
regulatory law than to private law since international treaties should have their own 
purpose and policy to serve in a certain realm of international society.
This resemblance with regulatory conflicts suggests that Pulkowski’s focus on 
the American choice-of-law revolution is accurate,（117） as the interest analysis 
approaches proposed in the United States share the premise that states have interests 
even in their private laws.（118） This is an acknowledgment of the regulatory effect of 
private law,（119） which is not necessarily shared in the traditional continental system of 
conflict of laws. As we have noted, Pulkowski further relies on the comparative 
impairment approach. However, two comments on this point seem appropriate.
First, while it is true that the comparative impairment test may be an attractive 
（115） 　See, in III.A.3.
（116） 　For a more detailed and historical explanation, see, e.g., Ralf Michaels, Towards A Private 
International Law for Regulatory Conflicts? 59 Japanese Yearbook of International Law 175 
(2016), p. 179.
（117） 　In fact, the existing literature indicates that the American choice of laws doctrine could offer 
useful tools to the management of regulatory law. See, e.g., Annelise Riles, Managing 
Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 47 
(2014), p. 63, available at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2335338>. (proposing a conflict of laws 
approach to managing financial regulations with a detailed analysis on mainly the American 
conflict laws doctrine).
（118） 　See Symeonides, supra note 89, p. 105.
（119） 　Michaels, supra note 116, p. 183.
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approach for regulatory conflicts,（120） the American conflict-of-laws doctrine has 
another analytically important input: the distinction between “false” and “true” 
conflicts. This distinction, formulated by Currie, has been accepted beyond the 
interest analysis approaches in the United States.（121） The false-conflict pattern 
indicates that only one of the involved states has interests in the application of its law 
to the case;（122） in contrast, true conflict means that more than one state is interested.（123）
Currie’s solution to a false approach demands that the judge apply only the law 
of the interested state.（124） As Symeonides puts it, this solution to a false conflict could 
“effectuate the polices of an interested state without scarifying any policies of an 
uninterested state.”（125） This evaluation suggests that the false/true distinction may be 
regarded as a legal “technique”（126） in the conflict of laws doctrine that helps the judge 
and decision-maker solve regulatory conflicts. As Michaels argues, “technique is in 
fact necessary in order to deal with political questions precisely because the law 
cannot solve them in political way.”（127） Given the inherent political tension between 
（120） 　See, e.g., Michaels & Pauwelyn, supra note 84, p. 359; Riles, supra note 117, p. 114.
（121） 　Symeonides, supra note 89, p. 101. Yet in addition to these, Currie proposed another pattern, 
called no-interest pattern or un-provided-for pattern, where no state is interested. See id. p. 100.
（122） 　Ibid.
（123） 　Ibid.
（124） 　Id. p. 101.
（125） 　Ibid.
（126） 　For an argument on the importance of technicality in conflict of laws, see Ralf Michaels, 
Private International Law and the Question of Universal Values, in Franco Ferrari & Diego P. 
Fernández Arroyo (eds.), The Continuing Relevance of Private International Law (Edward 
Elgar, 2019 forthcoming), available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3384877>.
（127） 　Michaels, supra note 116, p. 192. See also, Ralf Michaels, Post-critical Private International 
Law: From Politics to Technique, in Horatia Muir Watt & Diego P. Fernández Arroyo (eds.), 
Private International Law and Global Governance (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 54.
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the WTO and the CDC, the analysis here would be insightful. To prevent the 
intensive and excessive politicization of conflict management, the first step must be 
to identify false conflicts at the level of interpretation. While Pulkowski himself 
argues for the avoidance of rule conflicts at this level, the distinction of false/true 
conflicts can offer an additional basis to his idea of harmonizing interpretation.
Second, while Pulkowski relies on the balancing of interests（128） to solve 
irreconcilable or true conflicts, this approach would depend on who the interpreter is 
and always involves the possibility of reaching different results.（129） For example, as 
Michaels and Pauwelyn discuss, “when the WTO balances trade against 
environmental protection under GATT Article XX, the environment is set up as an 
exception,” and “environmental measures may only trump trade liberalization rules in 
case they are ‘necessary’ and there is no ‘less trade restrictive alternative’ available.”（130） 
On the other hand, they continue, “[b]efore an environmental tribunal, the opposite 
would likely to be true.”（131） By contrast, Pulkowski seems to propose the comparative 
impairment approach as a universal conflict rule for true conflicts in international law. 
However, it appears inevitable that, in an inter-systemic conflict, different values or 
perspectives inherent in each regime would individually affect the manner in which 
interests are weighted as well as the results. As Vadi puts it, citing a relatively recent 
WTO case, China-Publication and Audiovisual Entertainment Products,（132） the case 
（128） 　It should be noted that even the less problematic comparative impairment test involves 
balancing. See Symeonides, supra note 89, p. 106 (stating: “inasmuch as the gravity of the loss 
depends on the strength and importance of each state’ s interest, one cannot avoid the conclusion 
that comparative impairment does weigh the interests” ).
（129） 　It seems that this structural bias could affect interpretation and application not only during the 
dispute resolution before tribunals of regimes, but also in an everyday operation of the treaties 
by national decision-makers.
（130） 　See Michaels & Pauwelyn, supra note 84, p. 368.
（131） 　Ibid.
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“albeit adjudicated after the inception the CDC, does not significantly change the 
argumentative framework of both Panel and AB …… In sum ‘economic factors drive 
the WTO analysis.’”（133）
Unfortunately, in this respect, even the most promising comparative 
impairment approach itself does not provide a neutral and objective guideline for 
balancing interests.（134） Solving true conflicts seems to need a more sophisticated 
balancing method. This can be achieved by reevaluating the existing conflict-of-laws 
techniques,（135） or perhaps it needs to be explored outside the conflict of laws doctrine, 
such as proportionality.（136） In short, it must be necessary to develop a more 
sophisticated conflict-of-laws approach to regulatory conflicts.（137）
B. Specific Issues to the WTO‒CDC Conflict
1. Art. 20 of the CDC
With respect to management methods, we need to first address the managing ability 
of Art. 20 of the CDC, the convention’s internal conflict management mechanism.
（132） 　WTO Panel Report, China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R, adopted 12 
August 2009; WTO Appellate Body Report, China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and 
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/
DS363?AB/R, adopted 21 December 2009.
（133） 　Vadi, supra note 51, p. 195.
（134） 　See Symeonides, supra note 89, p. 106 (stating in relation to the comparative impairment 
approach: “[t]he question is not whether courts can or should weigh state interests, but rather 
how to weigh them, and how to resolve the resulting conflicts” ).
（135） 　See Michaels, supra note 126.
（136） 　See Vadi, supra note 51, p. 187 (citing Rachael Craufurd Smith, The UNESCO Convention 
on the Protection and Promotion of Cultural Expressions: Building a New World Information 
and Communication Order?, International Journal of Communication, Vol. 1 (2007), p. 40-41).
（137） 　See Michaels, supra note 126, p. 191.
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As we have observed, there is controversy surrounding the interpretation of 
Art. 20. While most commentators acknowledge its ambivalent nature, Pulkowski 
interprets the provision as an operational conflict rule, which focuses on the time 
difference between the CDC ratification and the WTO accession. Indeed, Pulkowski’s 
reading of Art. 20 could certainly clarify the article’s meaning as a conflict rule. 
However, his interpretation cannot be accepted for two reasons.
Firs t , such reading would render the mutual support iveness and 
nonsubordination principles (Art. 20(1)) as nonsense. As we have argued, these 
principles explicitly represent the CDC’s inter-systemic relation with other treaties, 
especially WTO law. Despite his acknowledgment of the WTO‒CDC conflict as 
inter-systemic, Pulkowski seems to commit himself to a traditional, intra-systemic 
view of the WTO‒CDC relation with respect to the interpretation of Art. 20.
Second, his reading seems incompatible with the background of the CDC’s 
establishment as a sort of antithesis to the WTO.（138） If the article provided preference 
to preexisting treaties, including the GATT, in a situation where many states had 
already become members of the WTO and the strong proponents for the CDC had 
found a more culturally conscious legal framework, it would be difficult to 
understand why the drafters formulated such a practically trade-favorable conflict 
clause under the CDC.
Therefore, Art. 20 of the CDC itself does not seem to function as Pulkowski 
expects. Two further observations should be made here.
On the one hand, as Pulkowski and others emphasize, it is true that an 
interpreter should not ignore the provision as a mere agreement to disagree.（139） The 
article is a text representative of an aspiration for a more coherent development of 
（138） 　See, in II.A.
（139） 　See, e.g., Vadi, supra note 51, p. 172.
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international law in the denial of hierarchical coordination. It is also undeniable that 
the clause can provide the interpreter and decision-maker with a positive law 
foundation to interpret, apply, and formulate rules under or relevant to the CDC. In 
fact, some scholars expect that the mutual supportiveness principle in international 
environmental treaties functions as a new principle of interpretation and rulemaking 
in the face of international law fragmentation.（140）
On the other hand, it would be necessary to develop a more sophisticated 
conflict rule based on the principle to manage inter-systemic conflicts. In this respect, 
Michaels and Pauwelyn’s analysis of the Preamble of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety should be cited here.（141） As with Art. 20 of the CDC, this preamble also 
explicitly adopts the mutual supportiveness and nonsubordination principles. 
Michaels and Pauwelyn observe that the preamble not only shows its desire to keep 
intra-systemic coherence, as expressed by the mutual supportiveness principle, but 
also admits the limitation of such desire, as proved by the nonsubordination 
principle.（142） However, they mention that this ambivalence “tend[s] towards 
circularity” as a conflicts rule.（143） The authors thus hope for the development of “the 
（140） 　For an analysis of the concept of mutual supportiveness under international environmental 
agreements, see Tomoaki Nishimura, Tasukokukan Kankō Kyōtei to “Tano Kokusai Bunsho” 
tono Sōgo Renkan: Nagoya Gitesho wo Sozai to shite [Interplay between Multilateral 
Environmental Agreement and other International Instruments: Analyzing Nagoya Protocol], 
Kokusaihō Gaikō Zassi [The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy], Vol. 113, No. 4 
(2015), p. 525, p. 539ff.
（141） 　Recitals 8‒10 of the Preamble read: “Recognizing that trade and environment agreements 
should be mutually supportive with a view to achieving sustainable development” ; 
“Emphasizing that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and 
obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements” ; “Understanding that the 
above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to other international agreements.”
（142） 　Michaels & Pauwelyn, supra note 84, p. 371.
（143） 　Ibid.
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fine-grained conflict-of-laws rules and approaches …… for the relationship between 
trade and environment.”（144） 
In sum, while it is true that Art. 20 of the CDC could provide an important 
reference point for conflict management, it does not work as a sufficient conflict rule 
by itself and further development beyond the text of the provision should be 
necessary.
2. Some Remarks
As the last discussions in this paper, we provide two sets of remarks on Pulkowski’s 
analysis and proposal on the WTO‒CDC conflict based on (a) interpretation and (b) 
examples of true conflicts.
a) Interpretation
As discussed above, the first step is to identify false conflicts and confer a preference 
to the rules of the only interested regime. In fact, identifying false conflicts means 
ascertaining whether the WTO or the CDC are interested in the application of their 
rules to the concrete case at hand. Since this is a matter of interpretation, such 
decisions should be made in reference with the rules of interpretation in international 
law, such as Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.（145） As 
Pulkowski investigates, there seems to be non-negligible room for conflict avoidance 
at the level of interpretation.（146）
Instead of dwelling on possible interpretations on a rule-by-rule basis, we 
provide short comments on Pulkowski’s search for a shared goal among the regimes. 
As noted above,（147） Pulkowski claims that individual cultural liberty can be seen as the 
（144） 　Ibid.
（145） 　See supra note 58.
（146） 　See, in III.1.a).
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shared goal among the WTO, the CDC, as well as human rights regimes. Somewhat 
similarly, some authors focus on the concept of sustainable development as a unifying 
idea for the fields of environment, social development, and economic development to 
manage different regimes.（148） Arguably, such a basic and shared goal or idea should be 
necessary to indicate the future direction of interpretation, which must be done in the 
face of regime conflicts.（149） Thus, further research is necessary to examine whether 
and how we can set shared goals among the regimes concerned.（150）
b) Examples of True Conflicts
Pulkowski provides case 1 and 2 as examples（151） of possible rule conflicts that cannot 
be reconciled through interpretation, which may be called true conflicts from this 
study’s perspective. On the one hand, as shown above, it seems that case 2 properly 
demonstrates the most likely situation where trade-restrictive cultural measures, 
which can be permitted under the CDC’s rights-conferring rules, would violate trade 
principles under WTO law.
On the other hand, a closer look at case 1 may cast some doubt on whether it 
precisely shows a true-conflict pattern. With respect to case 1, Pulkowski states that 
the subsidy for a developing country’s young nationals who produce cultural products 
related to local stories would be potentially prohibited under Arts. III:2 and 4 of the 
GATT. If the phrase “potentially prohibited” indicates a possibility that such subsidy 
may be interpreted as permissible under the WTO,（152） the case might fall under the 
（147） 　See, in III.1.b).
（148） 　See, e.g., Nishimura, supra note 140, p. 543.
（149） 　Yet, it is equally true that the “common good” or the “harmony of interests” approach to 
conflict management would be doubtful as well. See Koskennemi, supra note 114, pp. 306-308.
（150） 　In particular, on value conflicts among universal values, see Michales, supra note 126.
（151） 　See, in III.A.3.
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false-conflict pattern, where only the CDC has interests; thus, CDC rules would 
apply.
While his examples are limited to these, Vadi demonstrates, though in relation 
to foreign direct investment, some hypothetical scenarios with respect to food cultural 
practices, indigenous intangible heritage, and music and language.（153） One of them 
involves measures to restrict the use of wine labels, such as the term château, to 
foreign imported wines.（154） In fact, Vadi mentions the European Commission’s 
consideration of the United States’s request to end the ban on the European 
importation of American wines labeled château.（155） Another example is the case 
where some measures to protect languages at risk of extinction, such as local 
language content requirements,（156） would be treated as violation of the national 
treatment obligation under WTO law.（157） All these measures would fall under the 
CDC’s scope of application and risk being in conflict with trade principles under 
WTO law.
V. Conclusion
Focusing the relation between WTO law and the CDC, this paper has analyzed the 
conflict management methods of different international treaties from a conflict of 
laws perspective. The author’s core argument is that a conflict of laws perspective 
would be useful in analyzing the nature of regime conflicts and detecting possible 
problems inherent in inter-systemic or regulatory conflicts. In particular, the basic 
（152） 　See, in III.A.3.
（153） 　Vadi, supra note 51, pp. 177-183.
（154） 　Id. pp. 179-180.
（155） 　Id. p. 179.
（156） 　See Lemire v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18. 
Id. pp. 188-189.
（157） 　Id. pp. 182-183.
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framework for analyzing regulatory conflicts, that is, the false/true distinction, could 
help the interpreter deal with seemingly irreconcilable rule conflicts as false ones. In 
short, conflict of laws could contribute to the conflict management of different 
international law branches more as an analytical perspective rather than a specific 
solution. If this contribution as an analytical perspective seems trivial, it is because 
the conflict of law doctrine itself is yet to develop a set of methods to properly 
manage regulatory conflicts. This necessitates further research on how to cultivate the 
conflict of law doctrine to cope with a variety of norm conflicts, including regulatory 
conflicts, in the global society.（158）
（158） 　See Dai Yokomizo, Gurōbal Hō-Tagenshugi no motodeno Teishoku-Hō [Conflict of laws in 
Global Legal Pluralism], Ronkyū Juristo [Quarterly Jurist], no. 23 (2017), p. 79.
